Nikto ini adalah webserver scanner, gimana supaya bisa ngecheck sebuah server. Mayan buat jaga jaga + nyari nyari sesuatu..

Info lengkapnya:

Nikto is an Open Source (GPL) web server scanner which performs comprehensive tests against web servers for multiple items, including over 3500 potentially dangerous files/CGIs, versions on over 900 servers, and version specific problems on over 250 servers. Scan items and plugins are frequently updated and can be automatically updated (if desired).

Nikto is not designed as an overly stealthy tool. It will test a web server in the shortest timespan possible, and it’s fairly obvious in log files. However, there is support for LibWhisker’s anti-IDS methods in case you want to give it a try (or test your IDS system).

Not every check is a security problem, though most are. There are some items that are “info only” type checks that look for items that may not have a security flaw, but the webmaster or security engineer may not know are present on the server. These items are usually marked appropriately in the information printed. There are also some checks for unknown items which have been seen scanned for in log files.

Version 2 adds a ton of enhancements, including:

• Fingerprinting web servers via favicon.ico files


• 404 error checking for each file type


• Enhanced false positive reduction via multiple methods: headers, page content, and content hashing


• Scan tuning to include or exclude entire classes of vulnerability checks



• Uses LibWhisker 2, which has its own long list of enhancements


• A “single” scan mode that allows you to craft an HTTP request manually


• Basic template engine so that HTML reports can be easily customized


• An experimental knowledge base for scans, which will allow regenerated reports and retests (future)


• Optimizations, bug fixes and more…

Download Nikto 2 disini:

nikto-current.tar.gz

Baca lebih lanjut  Disini.

Ever since its debut, Firefox has garnered a reputation for being an enormously customizable program, both through its add-on architecture and its internal settings. In fact, many of Firefox’s settings aren’t exposed through the Tools > Options menu; the only way to change them is to edit them manually. In this article, we’ll explore some of the most useful Firefox settings that you can change on your own and that aren’t normally available through the program’s graphical interface.

The closest analogy to how Firefox manages its internal settings is the Windows Registry. Each setting, or preference, is given a name and stored as a string (text), integer (number) or Boolean (true/false) value. However, Firefox doesn’t keep its settings in the registry, but in a file called prefs.js. You can edit prefs.js directly, but it’s often easier to change the settings through the browser window.

Type about:config in the address bar and press Enter, and you’ll see all the settings currently enumerated in prefs.js, listed in alphabetical order. To narrow down the hundreds of configuration preferences to just the few you need, type a search term into the Filter: bar. (Click the Show All button or just clear the Filter: bar to get the full list back again.)

To edit a preference, double-click on the name and you’ll be prompted for the new value. If you double-click on an entry that has a Boolean value, it’ll just switch from true to false or vice versa; double-click again to revert to the original setting. Not all changes take effect immediately, so if you want to be absolutely certain a given change is in effect, be sure to close and reopen Firefox after making a change.

Note that not every setting in about:config exists by default. Some of them have to be created manually. If you want to add a new preference, right-click somewhere on the page and select New, then select the type of item to create (String, Integer or Boolean) and supply the name and value.

Before you begin



Here are a few caveats to keep in mind as you explore and tweak:

Not everyone will get the same benefits by enabling these tweaks. This is especially true for changing the network settings. If you habitually visit sites that don’t allow a large number of connections per client, for instance, you won’t see much benefit from raising the number of connections per server.

Some hacks may have a limited shelf life. With each successive release of Firefox, the need for tweaking any of the performance-related config settings (like the network settings) may dwindle as Firefox becomes more self-tuning based on feedback from real-world usage scenarios. In short, what works now may not always work in the future — and that might not be a bad thing.

Keep a log of everything you change, or make backups. If you tweak something now and notice bizarre activity in a week, you’ll want to be able to track back to what was altered and undo it. Firefox does show which about:config changes have been set manually, but this isn’t always the most accurate way to find out what you changed.

To make a backup of your preferences in Firefox, just make a copy of the file prefs.js, which is kept in your Firefox profile folder. If you mess something up, you can always copy this file back in. (Be sure to shut down Firefox before making a copy of prefs.js or moving a copy back into the profile folder!)

In Windows XP, the profile folder is

\Documents and Settings\<username>\Application Data\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\<profile ID>.default\

In Windows Vista, this folder is

\Users\<username>\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\<profile ID>.default\

Note that Application Data and AppData are hidden folders by default, so they may not show up unless you force Explorer to show hidden objects. (Open the Control Panel, double-click Folder Options, select the View tab, select “Show hidden files and folders” and click OK.)

In Mac OS X, the profile folder is

<username>/Library/Application Support/Firefox/Profiles/<profile ID>.default/

and in Linux it’s

~/.mozilla/firefox/<profile ID>.default/

but on those platforms it’s usually quicker simply to search for prefs.js.

Alternatively, you can use the handy Firefox Extension Backup Extension (FEBE). It backs up not only the prefs.js file but just about every other thing in Firefox — extensions, themes, cookies, form history and so on.

Wah, ini cerita yang sempat gempar loh )

Bagaimana seorang teman yang ingin melihat hasil nilai temennya gak di kasi tau.

A: “Woi, berape nilai loe?? Kasi tau gw donk.. Pelit amat loe.”

B: “Mo tau ajah loe, rahasia donk..”

C: “Agh kasi tau ajah lah.. Gw juga ni, gw dapet 66 Tekkom”

B: “Gak mau gw.. Klo bisa lihat sendiri di binus maya gih”

A: “Agh!! BT gwe.. pelit loe.. awas ajah, ntr gwe lihat nilai loe dah!!”

Akhirnya si A pun berpikir panjang & dia inget klo di binusmaya NIM + Passnya gitu gitu ajah..

Dia berfikir, NIM dia gwe tau.. Tinggal passnya doank nih.. Hmm NIM dia : 0800XXXXXX

Passnya apa ya??

Akhirnya si A ini membuat secari code menggunakan perl di bawah ini.. Katanya sih mo buat bruteforce, aye aye.. Gila juga nie anak.. Hahaha.. Akhirnya sehari semalam dia berfikir keras.. Akhirnya jadilah..

Binus Maya hack Brute Force Perl

Nah, setelah dia buad codenya..

Dia fetch ke server dia, berhubung pake FREEBSD

Jalanin perlnya: perl binusmaya.binus.ac.id 0800XXXXXX

Dalam sekejap.. di emailnya yahoonya masuk:

Flag this message

Selamat Anda Dapet Pass BinusMaya


Tuesday, XXXXXXXX XX, 2007 4:10 AM

From:

“nobody” <nobody@freebsdrocks.net>

Add sender to Contacts

To:

“Anak, Dungu” <xxxxxxx@yahoo.com>

—–Inline Attachment Follows—–

NIM: 0800XXXXXX


PASS: 171286

Walhasil, si A login dah kesini dengan NIM + Pass tersebut

Login BinusMaya Lama

Inilah yang A dapatkan dari sana.. secarik nilai:

Hasil Nilai Si B

Wah.. Akhirnya.. Si A Melenggang lenggang..

A: “Woi B, Pred dah Loe!!”

A: “Gw tau dah nilai loe, ama kelas loe yang sekarang!! Pelit banget sih loe mo ngasi tau ajah susah!! Ini kan nilai loe… Blalalalalalallalalalallalalala…”

B: “Hah!! tau dari mana loe anzink!! Loe lihat punya gwe ya??”

A: “Wahaha.. ya gitu dech.. Tapi tenang, cuma gw yang tau.. Hahaha.. ”

Nah sekarang, buat temen temen, kan dah di kasi ama binus ampe 15 char tuh, gunain sebaik baiknya ya, jgn cuma make 6 password ya.. ^_^ mungkin brute force yang skrg agak lama.. coz dah digit + alphabet.. Hehehe…

Caution: With tools such as these, we do not condone their use for anything but testing networks for which you have the authority and for implementing defensive measures. Have fun!

Rainbow tables reduce the difficulty in brute force cracking a single password by creating a large pre-generated data set of hashes from nearly every possible password.  Rainbow Tables and RainbowCrack come from the work and subsequent paper by Philippe Oechslin [1]. The method, known as the Faster Time-Memory Trade-Off Technique, is based on research by Martin Hellman & Ronald Rivest done in the early 1980’s on the performance trade-offs between processing time and the memory needed for cryptanalysis. In his paper published in 2003, Oechslin refined the techniques and showed that the attack could reduce the time to attack 99.9% of Microsoft’s LAN Manager passwords (alpha characters only) to 13.6 seconds from 101 seconds. Further algorithm refinements also reduced the number of false positives produced by the system.

The main benefit of Rainbow Tables is that while the actual creation of the rainbow tables takes much more time than cracking a single hash, after they are generated you can use the tables over and over again. Additionally, once you have generated the Rainbow Tables, RainbowCrack is faster than brute force attacks and needs less memory than full dictionary attacks.

Rainbow Tables are popular with a particularly weak password algorithm known as Microsoft LM hash. LM stands for LAN Manager, this password algorithm was used in earlier days of Windows and still lives on only for compatibility reasons. By default Windows XP or even Windows Server 2003 keeps the LM hash of your passwords in addition to a more secure hash (NTLM or NTLMv2). This allows for the benefit of backwards compatibility with older operating systems on your network but unfortunately makes the job of password cracking easier if you can obtain the LM hashes instead of the NTLM hashes.

Microsoft’s LAN Manager algorithm and its weaknesses

So why is the LM algorithm weak? “The LANManger scheme has several weaknesses, including converting all characters to uppercase, splitting passwords into 7-byte chunks, and not using an additional random element known as ’salt.” [2]

These three issues give rainbow tables their cracking power.  By converting all characters to uppercase you effectively cut your key space in half.  So if you had passwords of only characters (A-Z, a-z) you would think you would have 52 possibilities, but in reality with LM, you only have 26 because password are converted to all uppercase.  So my way secure password of PaSsWoRd would be converted automatically to PASSWORD.

Passwords longer than 7 characters are split into 2 chunks so a 14 character password is effectively turned into two, seven character passwords (and converted to uppercase).  The chunks can also be attacked separately as you will see when we start cracking passwords.

Lastly, by not salting any of the passwords no extra complexity is added to stored passwords.

For some more background info check out the LM section of Wikipedia.org: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LM_hash

From the Rainbow Tables wiki:

“Rainbow tables use a refined algorithm by using a number of different reduction functions to create multiple parallel chains within a single “rainbow” table, reducing the probability of false positives from accidental chain collisions, and thus increasing the probability of a correct password crack. As well as increasing the probability of a correct crack for a given table size, the use of multiple reduction functions also greatly increases the speed of lookups.

Rainbow tables are specific to the hash function they were created for e.g., MD5 tables can crack only MD5 hashes. The theory of this technique was first pioneered by Philippe Oechslin [3] as a fast form of time-memory tradeoff [4], which he implemented in the Windows password cracker Ophcrack. The more powerful RainbowCrack program was later developed that can generate and use rainbow tables for a variety of character sets and hashing algorithms, including LM hash, MD5, SHA1, and NTLM.”[5]

Let’s check out some sample rainbow table configurations and see how they fare, as we go thru the tutorial all of this should make more sense.

LM configuration #0

Has a success probability of 99.90% and only takes up 610 MB.

LM configuration #1

Has a success probability of 99.04% and takes up 3 GB.

LM configuration #5

Has a success probability of 99.1% and takes up 24 GB.  This is starting to get large but 1) not THAT large with as cheap as hard drive space is and 2) with the character set involved.  Don’t forget this will work on passwords up to 14 characters as well.  What starts to make a difference is how long it takes to compute these tables.

LM configuration #6

Has a success probability of 99.9% and takes up 64 GB.  This character set includes all possible characters on a standard keyboard (not including alt+xxx characters). So this table set is likely to crack any windows password up 14 characters in minutes. This is great but on one computer it will take about 2 years to generate these tables (Faster Time-Memory Trade-Off Technique).

You can see demos of some of these configurations in action at the Project RainbowCrack website [6].

Using Rainbow Tables & RainbowCrack

Example 1:

First download RainbowCrack for your platform from www.antsight.com/zsl/rainbowcrack/ .

We will use our LM alpha (configuration 0) rainbow tables.

** You will need to either create them or unzip [7] them and they the will look something like:

128,000,000 bytes    lm_alpha#1-7_0_2100×8000000_all.rt

128,000,000 bytes    lm_alpha#1-7_1_2100×8000000_all.rt

128,000,000 bytes    lm_alpha#1-7_2_2100×8000000_all.rt

128,000,000 bytes    lm_alpha#1-7_3_2100×8000000_all.rt

128,000,000 bytes    lm_alpha#1-7_4_2100×8000000_all.rt

If everything goes well, backup all files (recommended especially if you just made them and didn’t download them) and then get ready to sort them.

To speed up the search of our rainbow table, we should sort the rainbow table with “rtsort.exe” in advance.

In fact “rcrack.exe” only accepts sorted rainbow tables.

We sort the rainbow tables by using the following command:

Use these commands:

rtsort lm_alpha#1-7_0_2100×8000000_all.rt

rtsort lm_alpha#1-7_1_2100×8000000_all.rt

rtsort lm_alpha#1-7_2_2100×8000000_all.rt

rtsort lm_alpha#1-7_3_2100×8000000_all.rt

rtsort lm_alpha#1-7_4_2100×8000000_all.rt

Each command will take several minutes to complete. The “rtsort.exe” utility will sort the file and write back to the original file.

Notice: If free memory size is smaller than the file size, we can’t load the file into memory at a time. In which case extra free disk space as large as the file to be sorted is required to apply an external sort.

Once rtsort has completed you are ready to use rcrack against some hashes.

To see available options just type “rcrack”

C:\rainbowcrack-1.2-win\rainbowcrack-1.2-win>rcrack

RainbowCrack 1.2 – Making a Faster Cryptanalytic Time-Memory Trade-Off

by Zhu Shuanglei < shuanglei@hotmail.comThis e-mail address is being protected from spam bots, you need JavaScript enabled to view it >

http://www.antsight.com/zsl/rainbowcrack/

usage: rcrack rainbow_table_pathname -h hash

rcrack rainbow_table_pathname -l hash_list_file

rcrack rainbow_table_pathname -f pwdump_file

rainbow_table_pathname: pathname of the rainbow table(s), wildchar(*, ?) supported

-h hash:                use raw hash as input

-l hash_list_file:      use hash list file as input, each hash in a line

-f pwdump_file:         use pwdump file as input, this will handle LAN Manager  ha

sh only

example: rcrack *.rt -h 5d41402abc4b2a76b9719d911017c592

rcrack *.rt -l hash.txt

rcrack *.rt -f hash.txt

Launch the program by issuing the command:

rcrack c:\rainbowcrack\*.rt -l hashlist.txt

You should replace “c:\rainbowcrack\” with where you placed your sorted rainbow tables.

To crack some hashed windows passwords, the syntax is similar:

rcrack c:\rainbowcrack\*.rt -f pwdumpfile.txt

rcrack c:\rainbowcrack\*.rt -l justhashlist.txt

rcrack  c:\rainbowcrack\*.rt –h 213D466DB5B288F0F82E44EC0938F4F4

Where pwdumpfile.txt is the results of using a hash dumping utility like pwdump2, pwdump3, samdump, etc to dump the LAN Manager’s passwords.

If your password consists of only letters only, rcrack should be able to crack it with a success rate of  99.9%.

Let’s try it against the following hash file in pwdump format (so use the –f option):

remote:”":E52CAC67419A9A224A3B108F3FA6CB6D:8846F7EAEE8FB117AD06BDD830B7586C:::

randy:”":98B5AFEB67293D6AAAD3B435B51404EE:A9F34664151F6360757B31644F37E025:::

Asmith:”":E165F0192EF85EBBAAD3B435B51404EE:E4EBE0E7EF708DC9FD240135D3D43D89:::

Bsmith:”":136A8418CF76C4F7AAD3B435B51404EE:3431E75AD08DCA56EB53AEAAB9926589:::

csmith:”":BB26C063532826AA531C3383FDDBFF2A:A2746ED4129985C0251D2B968C4889FE:::

Dsmith:”":A8EED815A197BD87AAD3B435B51404EE:F09A31889C35B8C9746B8F31FC3A868F:::

Esmith:”":5A9DB9F8BB5DF0CBAAD3B435B51404EE:5FCC20A69EC76AD91214102B4D7DE24E:::

Fsmith:”":213D466DB5B288F0F82E44EC0938F4F4:FAF10460760FA3F1ED804C7C724CB3D4:::

Gsmith:”":385A83A746BFA8F2AAD3B435B51404EE:1CC1B3958B564125D307BA8D9D60DF69:::

Hsmith:”":78BCCAEE08C90E29AAD3B435B51404EE:972E8E7D5568F70AC896B2C76E1395DC:::

Jsmith:”":59E2DB85E9D49595B75E0C8D76954A50:147D125645D463C33D72309525E9B0BC:::

Ksmith:”":59E2DB85E9D49595B75E0C8D76954A50:147D125645D463C33D72309525E9B0BC:::

Lsmith:”":13D855FC4841C7B1AAD3B435B51404EE:3DCEBC92C0ED8F52B1D759DD35CF3F0F:::

Msmith:”":D71808BF36F81510ADEE49688244F15A:45E8DA896575E2F5455B037FCC5AA51A:::

Nsmith:”":9C92FA4960AC2536AAD3B435B51404EE:C318744C4291EA46BC65082636CC9509:::

Osmith:”":1153C3961EE58C3BAAD3B435B51404EE:672532E8C0C490BD47254DAED1CDCB36:::

Psmith:”":4A01C0E45FCA767AAAD3B435B51404EE:39981702716E054CBE6840A3CFD60327:::

Qsmith:”":6842A19CC4C509E0AAD3B435B51404EE:9FDA95FD6FCEE9C2C998CB8010F61F16:::

Rsmith:”":BC472F3BF9A0A5F63832C92FC614B7D1:D2A80A79980CFA21CB58B7CB129E2CAD:::

Ssmith:”":09755C01D2789BD8AAD3B435B51404EE:62F740C2EA31E10B54DB64CE12E867A6:::

Tsmith:”":13D855FC4841C7B1AAD3B435B51404EE:3DCEBC92C0ED8F52B1D759DD35CF3F0F:::

Usmith:”":9E2204E2058AC9E9417EAF50CFAC29C3:476541DEC5CB507A795FC1E989C9D36F:::

Vsmith:”":7F9CD2D7C93421D3F9DE51FBDAA2F725:16FAABB24B95B82EFC50B074B7324517:::

Wsmith:”":AC814111DF804A7482EFD6B2A69511D6:15B194EB8D8F27761E32F76B001553A0:::

Xsmith:”":AAD3B435B51404EEAAD3B435B51404EE:2321504F2FA9437FBBA66EA1623407D3:::

Ysmith:”":D5662E6B23655BF74EC0DA4207C2DE66:75344B75B5A96614FE179C0188A9634A:::

Zsmith:”":9224FC255C58C50E42B35806901777E7:0C105C9F4326C3AC100C2A5B7A04AD38:::

The Answers so you can check your work.

**32 users and 47 LM hashes 48 Total hashes. Xsmith will only be saved as NTLM because it’s greater than 14 characters.

You should see something similar to the following:

Figure 1.1: Rcrack at work with an lm_alpha rainbow table

Figure 1.2: The results of our cracking attempt.  26 of our 41 hashes found in about 12 minutes.  Also notice that the hash for the password “password” is the same because there is no salting with the LAN Manager   hashing algorithm.

statistics

——————————————————-

plaintext found:          26 of 41 (63.41%)

total disk access time:   62.51 s

total cryptanalysis time: 742.77s

total chain walk step:    203410183

total false alarm:        195135

total chain walk step due to false alarm: 142852030

result

——————————————————-

testuser1       TESTUSE<notfound>  hex:54455354555345<notfound>

remote          password  hex:70617373776f7264

joeuser         password  hex:70617373776f7264

averageguy      average  hex:61766572616765

harderpass      rootwars  hex:726f6f7477617273

demouser        demopass  hex:64656d6f70617373

randy           randy  hex:72616e6479

Asmith          ABCd  hex:41424364

Bsmith          <notfound>  hex:<notfound>

csmith          <notfound><notfound>  hex:<notfound><notfound>

Dsmith          <notfound>  hex:<notfound>

Esmith          <notfound>  hex:<notfound>

Fsmith          <notfound><notfound>  hex:<notfound><notfound>

Gsmith          gHgHgH  hex:674867486748

Hsmith          <notfound>  hex:<notfound>

Jsmith          <notfound><notfound>  hex:<notfound><notfound>

Ksmith          <notfound><notfound>  hex:<notfound><notfound>

Lsmith          ABCdef  hex:414243646566

Msmith          FOOTBAL<notfound>  hex:464f4f5442414c<notfound>

Nsmith          SOCCER  hex:534f43434552

Osmith          CROKET  hex:43524f4b4554

Psmith          <notfound>  hex:<notfound>

Qsmith          HOWNOW  hex:484f574e4f57

Rsmith          BROWNCOW  hex:42524f574e434f57

Ssmith          gHaNdI  hex:6748614e6449

Tsmith          ABCdef  hex:414243646566

Usmith          RTdotnet  hex:5254646f746e6574

Vsmith          <notfound><notfound>  hex:<notfound><notfound>

Wsmith          EASYoneISNTit  hex:454153596f6e6549534e546974

Xsmith            hex:

Ysmith          LSOISDABEST  hex:4c534f4953444142455354

Zsmith          RAINBOWTABLEZ  hex:5241494e424f575441424c455a

Example 2:

We are going to build our own tables using Configuration #1

**Note if you built your configuration #0 tables using rtgen use winrtgen (see exercise 4)

Table pre-computation commands:

rtgen lm alpha-numeric 1 7 0 2400 40000000 all

rtgen lm alpha-numeric 1 7 1 2400 40000000 all

rtgen lm alpha-numeric 1 7 2 2400 40000000 all

rtgen lm alpha-numeric 1 7 3 2400 40000000 all

rtgen lm alpha-numeric 1 7 4 2400 40000000 all

On a 666 MHz machine the table pre-computation time is about 15 days 17 hours, my P4 3.2 GHz with 1GB of RAM I created a table a day; so about 5 days.

Figure 2.1: Creating our LM alpha-numeric rainbow tables.

Now run that table against the same hash file, don’t forget to sort them first.  You should crack most, if not all, of the alpha-numeric passwords, as opposed to alpha passwords only from configuration #0.

Figure 2.2: The results of our attempts. 32 of 41 passwords were found.  Note that I ran this on my 3.2 GHz machine because I created the tables on it and didn’t want copy 3GB of rainbow tables to the slow computer.

statistics

——————————————————-

plaintext found:          32 of 41 (78.05%)

total disk access time:   233.84 s

total cryptanalysis time: 233.05 s

total chain walk step:    211003249

total false alarm:        104620

total chain walk step due to false alarm: 91734872

result

——————————————————-

testuser1       testuser1  hex:746573747573657231

remote          password  hex:70617373776f7264

joeuser         password  hex:70617373776f7264

averageguy      average  hex:61766572616765

harderpass      rootwars  hex:726f6f7477617273

demouser        demopass  hex:64656d6f70617373

randy           randy  hex:72616e6479

Asmith          ABCd  hex:41424364

Bsmith          ef456  hex:6566343536

csmith          <notfound><notfound>  hex:<notfound><notfound>

Dsmith          <notfound>  hex:<notfound>

Esmith          <notfound>  hex:<notfound>

Fsmith          <notfound><notfound>  hex:<notfound><notfound>

Gsmith          gHgHgH  hex:674867486748

Hsmith          ABC123  hex:414243313233

Jsmith          ABCdef123  hex:414243646566313233

Ksmith          ABCdef123  hex:414243646566313233

Lsmith          ABCdef  hex:414243646566

Msmith          FOOTBAL<notfound>  hex:464f4f5442414c<notfound>

Nsmith          SOCCER  hex:534f43434552

Osmith          CROKET  hex:43524f4b4554

Psmith          COW123  hex:434f57313233

Qsmith          HOWNOW  hex:484f574e4f57

Rsmith          BROWNCOW  hex:42524f574e434f57

Ssmith          gHaNdI  hex:6748614e6449

Tsmith          ABCdef  hex:414243646566

Usmith          RTdotnet  hex:5254646f746e6574

Vsmith          <notfound><notfound>  hex:<notfound><notfound>

Wsmith          EASYoneISNTit  hex:454153596f6e6549534e546974

Xsmith            hex:

Ysmith          LSOISDABEST  hex:4c534f4953444142455354

Zsmith          RAINBOWTABLEZ  hex:5241494e424f575441424c455a

Example 3:

Compare the results of the same hash file with Cain in Brute force mode, John the Ripper, and LC4.

Cain, in brute-force mode with an alpha-numeric character set, says it will take about 10 hours.

Figure 3.1: Cain in brute-force mode.

Figure 3.2: After 9+ hours it cracked 27 of the 41 hashes

John the Ripper, in default mode, was able to quickly (about 3 minutes) crack 32 of the 48 hashes.

Figure 3.3: JTR at work.

After 24 hours we had 45 of the 48 hashes.

Figure 3.4: JTR after 24 hours of cracking

The results of our efforts! All but 3 of the hashes were cracked in 24 hours by John. The “Xsmith” account with 15 characters was not cracked.  With enough time we should have been able to find the passwords for “csmith” and “Vsmith”

Note that this really wasn’t a fair assessment since john will try characters not in our rainbow tables.  If you want a really fair assessment, you should modify john’s ini file.  But I don’t plan on doing it that.  The point of the tables is the speed. But honestly, for this password file, John did really well.

Figure 3.5: the results 45 passwords cracked

Let’s see how LC4 fairs against our password file, I did turn off the dictionary and hybrid modes on LC4 and selected alphanumeric as our characters in the session options, so this should be a pretty fair “time to crack the same hashes” test.

Figure 3.6: Loading the password file of 32 users into LC4.

Figure 3.7: LC4 estimated about 11 hours to brute force crack the passwords using an alphanumeric character set.

In 11 hours we were able to crack 26 out of the 32 user accounts but the Xsmith account was not cracked because we did not attempt an NTLM attack.

Figure 3.8: So 11 hours versus 12.3795 minutes with the rainbow tables.

Example 4:

Using Cain and Abel’s Winrtgen to create your Rainbow Tables.  Winrtgen supports Rainbow Tables for the following hashing/encryption algorithms: LM, FastLM, NTLM, CiscoPIX, MD2, MD4, MD5, SHA-1, SHA-2 (256), SHA-2 (384), SHA-2 (512), MySQL (323), MySQL (SHA1) and RIPEMD160.

Figure 4.1: Open Winrtgen and select Add Table

Figure 4.2: Select LM, 1 to 7 for Min/Max Length, Chain Length 2400 and Chain Count 40,000,000.

As you see with one table we get about 60% success rate and it will take about 2 days to create the table on a P3 1GHz machine.  Feel free to manipulate Chain Length (remember that it will increase success rate but increase computation time) to whatever you can handle for table pre-computation time.  I will leave it at 2400 for now.  But 60% isn’t that great, for a 99.06% success rate you will need to create 5 tables (3 GB of space) and it will take about 12 days to create the tables. For a 99.63% success rate you will need to create 6 tables (3.57 GB of space) and it will take about 14 days to generate the tables.  I will go with 5 tables for a success rate of 99.06%.

Figure 4.3: Creating 5 rainbow tables with a success rate of 99.06% using about 3 GB of space.

Here is a handy reference table:

There are some typical configurations (for LM hash type, length from 1 to 7) you can use, for example:

Example 5:

Using Cain and Abel to crack passwords using Rainbow Tables

Step 1: Download [8] and install Cain.

Step 2: Click on the “Cracker” tab.  Select what type of passwords you want to crack.  In this case LM & NTLM Hashes.  Then right click and select “add to list.”  Navigate to where you have your text file of hashes, select it and then select next.

Figure 5.1: Loading hashes from file

Figure 5.2: Hashes loaded into Cain, ready to be cracked.

Step 3: Right click and select “select all” then right click again and select cryptanalysis attack and “LM Hashes via Rainbow Tables”

Figure 5.3: Selecting a cryptanalysis attack via Rainbow Tables.

Step 4: Click on Add Table.  Then navigate to where you have your rainbow tables, highlight them all and select Open.

Figure 5.4: Adding your rainbow tables to use for cracking.

Step 5: Click on “Start” and Cain will start to work through the rainbow tables.

Figure 5.5: Cain working through the Rainbow Tables cracking passwords.

Step 6: When its all done click Exit and it will show you the cracked passwords.

Figure 5.6: Cain finishes running though the Rainbow Tables.

Figure 5.7: Our cracked passwords in Cain.  Notice that Cain also found the NTLM password based on the LM password.

I am still confused what does “X, Y, or Z” mean?

Here are some things that may not be immediately clear when dealing with rainbow tables:

1- What do “t”, “m”, and “l” mean or stand for?

To answer this, let’s analyze an rtgen command:

rtgen lm alpha 1 7 0 2100 8000000 all

rtgen obviously means the program to run.  “lm” means we want to generate LAN Manager   tables.  “alpha” mean we want to use the characters listed in our charset.txt file for alpha:

alpha = [ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ]

“1” and “7” are our plaintext ranges.  So we want passwords from “A” to “ZZZZZZZ.”  If we had put plaintext length range “4-6″, “AAAA” and “ZZZZZZ” would be among the key space; but “AAA” would not because it has a length 3.  Remember that, for LAN Manager  , passwords they are broken up into 7 character chunks, so there would be no need to do a plaintext range of 1 to 8.  The “0” is our table number or rainbow table count, if you look at the rtgen commands to generate configuration #0 we create five tables 0 to 4.  This is so we can split up tables between computers making the rainbow tables and to increase our success rate. “2100” is our rainbow chain length. Chain length increases the success rate per table but does not increase table size.  It computes more hashes per chain but also takes longer to create and search the table. A common “upper” value for chain length is 4000-5000.  “8000000” is our rainbow chain count of each rainbow table.  Chain count is simply how many chains you want per table.  Increasing this value produces larger files with higher success rates, but the overall computation time isn’t affected.    You can adjust the chain count so your rainbow tables are conveniently sized (like for a CD or DVD).  The “all” is our file title suffix or what we want appended to the end of our table’s file name, it can be anything you want.

2- What do the different chain lengths and chain counts mean?

Chain Length increases the success rate per table.  It computes more hashes per chain but also takes longer to create and search the table. A common “upper” value for chain length is 4000-5000 but it can be whatever you want. Chain count is simply how many chains you want per table.  Increasing this value produces larger files with higher success rates, but the overall computation time isn’t affected.    You can adjust the chain count so your rainbow tables are conveniently sized (like for a CD or DVD) or to increase the success rate.

3- Why can’t I create just one rainbow table?

You can! But to get a high enough success rate that table will be too large to search in a reasonable amount of time. That is why we normally create several. Now we could, by adjusting chain length and chain count, create a giant rainbow table but we will have to sort it, which will take a long time and then search it, which will take an even longer time; thus reducing the whole point of rainbow tables.  It would be a more efficient use of space to create many rainbow tables so you can sort and search them faster.

4-I am still confused!

Then 1) go read the paper: http://lasecwww.epfl.ch/php_code/publications/search.php?ref=Oech03 and 2) check out the next section for some examples with Winrtgen which allows you to see (graphically) how changing values changes success rates, table size, and table generation time.

Using Winrtgen to see how chain length, chain count and number of tables effects success rate and computation time

We can see in this example that we get a 97.80% success rate with one LM ALPHA rainbow table with a Chain Length of 2400 and a Chain Count of 40,000,000.  It will take 2.23 days to generate the table on the computer (a P3 1.0 Ghz with 512 MB of RAM).

Increasing the Chain Length to 4000 increases our success rate to 99.11% but it now takes 3.67 days to generate the table.

LM Configuration #0 Configuration with 1 table.  75% success rate but only takes 9 hours to generate the table.

LM Configuration #0 with 5 tables (the recommended configuration).  Notice that for roughly the same amount of time and space as our first example with a Chain Length of 2400 and a Chain Count of 40,000,000 and a success rate of 97.80% we can get 99.90% with this Rainbow Table configuration. Another thing to note that we don’t see is sort time and how much longer it takes to sort one big table versus several smaller tables.

Let’s see how long it takes to create tables to find “all” possible password combinations—minus “ALT-XXX commands.”  For a 1GB table it will take 23 days with a 12.25% success rate.

And it will take 4.6 years (on a P3 1GHz machine) to generate enough tables to reach 99.98%!!!

Protecting yourself against RainbowCrack attacks and other password attacks

-Limiting physical access

-Continue to force the use of special characters

-Use ALT-XXX characters in your passwords

-Keep up with updates

-Use Pass phrases

-Use Multi-factor authentication

-Password Policy

-Use NTLM or NTLMv2

What if my Windows password is longer than 14 characters or the LAN Manager hash is not stored?

If your systems do not require the LAN Manager (LM) hash (for example if you are running an Active Directory (AD) domain), or if your password is >14 characters long, the LM hash will be stored as the blank LM hash, even though the clear text password itself is not blank.  Basically none of the cracking tools will see a LM hash.

If this is the case, you will need to audit your password hashes against the NTLM character set.

Limiting physical access

It’s a well-known fact that if someone has physical access to a machine then it’s not secure.  They can walk off with it, take the hard drive, turn it off, etc.  One common attack if you have physical access to a machine is to use a bootable Linux distro to simply boot into Linux and grab the SAM file off the windows partition.  You can then crack it at your leisure.  IronGeek wrote a good tutorial on this method and even has a video you can watch.  You can get it here: http://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=security/localsamcrack2.  Another interesting tool released by Eeye is SysRQ2: http://research.eeye.com/html/tools/RT20060801-8.html. “SysRq is a bootable CD image that allows a user to open a fully privileged (SYSTEM) command prompt on Windows 2000, Windows XP, and Windows Server 2003 systems by pressing Ctrl+Shift+SysRq at any time after startup.”

Continue to force the use of special characters

Even though rainbow tables can rip thru a LM password with any type of special character it still takes a large amount of time (1-2 years) to generate them, this will deter most people or force them to use an online hash cracking service [9].  It also greatly increases the time for brute force attempts.  In LC4 we go from 9-11 hours to brute force alpha-numeric password to 91 days to brute force passwords with the possibility of all special characters (minus ALT-XXX passwords).

Brute-force cracking time is greatly increased by using special characters in your passwords.  From 9 hours with just alpha-numeric to 91 days with all characters.

Use ALT-XXX characters in your passwords

ALT characters are produced by holding down the ALT key (or FN-ALT keys on some laptops) and pressing a three or four digit number sequence on your keypad.  Most password crackers cannot crack passwords with ALT characters.  Most ALT characters also have the added benefit that passwords that have ALT characters in them cannot be stored as LM hashes.

ALT characters which cause the LMHash to disappear

Some ALT characters not listed above, firstly, can still be stored as LM Hashes and secondly, can weaken your password because they are converted to uppercase before they are stored.  If you are going to use ALT characters go with the “safe” ones above.

A final note to add about ALT characters is that you may be unable to login to mixed environments with ALT passwords or be unable to authenticate to file shares using SAMBA or other non-Windows tools.

Keep up with updates

Keep up with your security patches.  While you can’t protect against zero day exploits you can protect against exploits that have patches!  All of the password dumping tools must have administrative level privileges to dump the hashes.  You can keep the majority of the bad guys out by patching your machines promptly against public exploits.  This will help keep you protected from that system/administrative level exploit that was just released to the public.

Use Pass phrases

Using pass phrases is the easiest and simplest way to protect you network from password cracking.  If your password policy makes use of pass phrases that are greater than 14 characters AND use special characters you can protect yourself from all but the determined attackers.  If your network is Windows 2000 and above you have a maximum length of 127 characters on your password/pass phrase; so sky’s the limit.  A pass phrase like “This is my Stupid Pass Phrase!” is long enough to be stored as NTLM or NTLMv2 (because it is longer than 14 characters), has Uppercase, Lowercase, Spaces, and Special Characters, and is easy to remember.  This is a much more secure password than even “@w3cjd$Beu=mDr”.  If you can get your users to do some character substitution on their pass phrases even better!

The use of strong passwords within an environment needs to be mandated for users. Using the stronger NTLMv2 hashing scheme won’t prevent a successful dictionary attack.  The use of strong passwords can be enforced on Windows NT through the use of the passfilt.dll. This is described in Microsoft Knowledgebase Article 161990 [10]. The use of strong passwords in Windows 2000, XP and 2003 can be enforced by settings in the Group Policy, which is described in Microsoft Knowledgebase Article 225230 [11].

Use Multi-factor authentication

Any decent CISSP could talk at length about multi-factor authentication and many have, so I won’t cover it much here except to say that any type of multi-factor authentication you can implement will help your network.  Whether it be biometric, smartcard, token, etc, anything that makes a user need to provide more than a simple password to log on to your network helps your security posture and stops a cracked password in its tracks.

Password Policy

A strong password policy will:

On Windows 2000 or above with Active Directory, password management is fairly easily controlled and implemented using group policy.  Forcing users to meet your password policy requirements is fairly easy with Active Directory and should be utilized if possible.

Use NTLM or NTLMv2

Instead of storing your user account password in clear-text, Windows generates and stores user account passwords by using two different password representations, generally known as “hashes.” When you set or change the password for a user account to a password that contains fewer than 15 characters, Windows generates both a LAN Manager hash (LM hash) and a Windows NT hash (NT hash) of the password. These hashes are stored in the local Security Accounts Manager (SAM) database or in Active Directory.

The LM hash is relatively weak compared to the NT hash, and it is therefore prone to fast brute force attack. Therefore, you may want to prevent Windows from storing an LM hash of your password

Windows 2000-based servers and Windows Server 2003-based servers can authenticate users who connect from computers that are running all earlier versions of Windows. However, versions of Windows earlier than Windows 2000 do not use Kerberos for authentication. For backward compatibility, Windows 2000 and Windows Server 2003 support LAN Manager (LM) authentication, Windows NT (NTLM) authentication, and NTLM version 2 (NTLMv2) authentications. The NTLM, NTLMv2, and Kerberos all use the NT hash, also known as the Unicode hash. The LM authentication protocol uses the LM hash.  The use of LAN Manager hashes on the network can be disabled on Windows NT, 2000, 2003 & XP through registry edits or through the Local Security Policy. The instructions to do so can be found at in Microsoft Knowledgebase Article 147706 [12].  The storage of LAN Manager hashes also needs to be disabled; this can be done for Windows 2000, XP and 2003 again via registry edits or the Local Security Policy. The instructions to do so can be found at in Microsoft Knowledgebase Article 299656 [13].

Method 1: Implement the NoLMHash Policy by Using Group Policy

To disable the storage of LM hashes of a user’s passwords in the local computer’s SAM database by using Local Group Policy (Windows XP or Windows Server 2003) or in a Windows Server 2003 Active Directory environment by using Group Policy in Active Directory (Windows Server 2003), follow these steps:

Method 2: Implement the NoLMHash Policy by Editing the Registry

Windows 2000 SP2 and Later

To add this key by using Registry Editor, follow these steps:

Notes

Windows XP and Windows Server 2003

Notes

Windows NT

Control of NTLM security is through the following registry key:

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\control\LSA

Name: LMCompatibilityLevel

Type: REG_DWORD


Value: 5 : DC refuses LM and NTLM responses (accepts only NTLMv2)

Value: 4 : DC refuses LM responses

Value: 3 : Send NTLMv2 response only


Value: 2 : Send NTLM response only

Value: 1 : Use NTLMv2 session security if negotiated

Value: 0 : default – Send LM response and NTLM response; never use NTLMv2 session security

More information on the values:

Level 0 – Send LM and NTLM response; never use NTLM 2 session security. Clients use LM and NTLM authentication, and never use NTLM 2 session security; domain controllers accept LM, NTLM, and NTLM 2 authentication.

Level 1 – Use NTLM 2 session security if negotiated. Clients use LM and NTLM authentication, and use NTLM 2 session security if the server supports it; domain controllers accept LM, NTLM, and NTLM 2 authentication.

Level 2 – Send NTLM response only. Clients use only NTLM authentication, and use NTLM 2 session security if the server supports it; domain controllers accept LM, NTLM, and NTLM 2 authentication.

Level 3 – Send NTLM 2 response only. Clients use NTLM 2 authentication, and use NTLM 2 session security if the server supports it; domain controllers accept LM, NTLM, and NTLM 2 authentication.

Level 4 – Domain controllers refuse LM responses. Clients use NTLM authentication, and use NTLM 2 session security if the server supports it; domain controllers refuse LM authentication (that is, they accept NTLM and NTLM 2).

Level 5 – Domain controllers refuse LM and NTLM responses (accept only NTLM 2). Clients use NTLM 2 authentication, use NTLM 2 session security if the server supports it; domain controllers refuse NTLM and LM authentication (they accept only NTLM 2).

Method 3: Use a Password That Is at Least 15 Characters Long

The simplest way to prevent Windows from storing an LM hash of your password is to use a password that is at least 15 characters long. In this case, Windows stores an LM hash value that cannot be used to authenticate the user.

To get an idea of the power of using NTLM for your hash algorithm lets see how long it will take to generate a NTLM mixed-alphanumeric rainbow table with Winrtgen:

For a mixed-alphanumeric NTLM table it will take 2.5 days to generate one table with a 4.32% success rate.

It will take over 100 rainbow tables, 60 GB of space, and 252 days to create the tables to crack the same passwords (with a 98.80% success rate) we have been attacking throughout this paper if they were stored as NTLM instead of LM!

Conclusion

As you can see Rainbow Tables and RainbowCrack are powerful password auditing tools.  The best course of action to protect yourself is to not allow the storage and use of LAN Manager (LM) passwords on your network if you don’t absolutely need to and to create and enforce a strong password policy that will force the storage and use of passwords as NTLM and not LM.  Additionally, the time to compute and space requirements of complex Rainbow Tables should limit the use of them to only determined attackers or auditors.  A strong password policy, strong domain security policy, and keeping up with your patches and updates are your best safeguards against password attacks.

References

RainbowCrack–Not a New Street Drug

http://redmondmag.com/columns/article.asp?EditorialsID=736

Rainbow Tables: Nature, Use, and Generation

http://security.the-engine.org/documents/48/rainbow-tables-nature-use-and-generation

“Faster Cryptanalytic time – memory trade off’ paper by Philippe Oechslin

http://lasecwww.epfl.ch/php_code/publications/search.php?ref=Oech03

Project RainbowCrack

http://www.antsight.com/zsl/rainbowcrack/

Get Free Rainbow Tables via torrent files


http://rainbowtables.shmoo.com/

The Tactical Use of RainbowCrack to Exploit Windows Authentication in a Hybrid Physical-Electronic Attack by Mike Mahurin

http://www.giac.org/practicals/GCIH/Mike_Mahurin_GCIH.pdf

Password Cracking: Rainbow Tables Explained

https://www.isc2.org/cgi-bin/content.cgi?page=738

How to prevent Windows from storing a LAN manager hash of your password in Active Directory and local SAM databases

http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?scid=KB;EN-US;q299656&

How to disable LM authentication on Windows NT

http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?scid=kb;EN-US;q147706

How to enable NTLM 2 authentication

http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?scid=kb;EN-US;q239869

Microsoft Windows 2000 Security Hardening Guide

http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/prodtech/windows2000/win2khg/03osinstl.mspx

10 tips in 10 minutes: Password policy considerations

http://searchwindowssecurity.techtarget.com/originalContent/0,289142,sid45_gci1044698,00.html

For use of useradd.txt to create the users:

http://www.rainbowtables.net

About the Author

Chris Gates, CISSP serves as the operations manager and course mentor for LearnSecurityOnline.com. Feel free to email comments and suggestions on the tutorial to chris [at] learnsecurityonline [dot] com.

Footnotes

[1] http://lasecwww.epfl.ch/php_code/publications/search.php?ref=Oech03

[2] http://securitynews.weburb.org/show.php3?item=newsboard&p%5BmessageId%5D=3090

[3] http://lasecwww.epfl.ch/philippe.shtml

[4] http://lasecwww.epfl.ch/~oechslin/publications/crypto03.pdf

[5] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rainbow_table

[6] Project RainbowCrack website www.antsight.com/zsl/rainbowcrack/

[7] Free Rainbow tables for download via torrent http://rainbowtables.shmoo.com/

[8] Download Cain and Abel from: http://www.oxid.it/

[9] http://www.rainbowcrack-online.com/ or  http://www.plain-text.info/

[10] http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?scid=kb;en-us;161990

[11] http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?scid=kb;en-us;225230

[12] http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?scid=kb;en-us;147706

[13] http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?scid=KB;EN-US;q299656&